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SUBSTANTIVE PARENTING ARRANGEMENTS IN THE USA:
UNPACKING THE POLICY CHOICES
Margaret F. Brinig
Notre Dame Law School
INTRODUCTION

In the US context, courts, legislatures, family lawyers, therapists, and interest groups
are currently focused on changing or maintaining the best rules for children whose
parents no longer live together. 1 Yet developing the “best” child custody 2 laws sees
policy makers use (or misuse) studies to inform policies, policies that are often not
up to the task in that they serve respective adult interests that couples’ separation
frequently puts at odds. The choices that theoretically range along a continuum
from bright line rules to complete judicial discretion are not easy ones. They involve
goals that all concerned view as important but that are valued differently and
sometimes compete, or become politicized.

Academics and legislatures agree that joint decision-making (or ‘joint legal custody’)
usually produces preferable results. All US states allow it, and many strongly presume that
it is appropriate. For a chart listing these, see L Elrod and R Spector, ‘A Review of the Year
in Family Law 2007-2008: Federalization and Nationalization Continue’ (2009) 42 Family
Law Quarterly 713, 758 and Chart 2.
2
In US statutes, various terms including joint custody, shared parenting, alternating
custody, residential placement, and possession and access all mean the same thing. While
the trend is to move away from the term “custody,” it was not changed to “parenting time”
in Arizona, a state discussed at some length here, until 2013.
1

1
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Although the US divorce rate has continued to fall since its peak in 1981, to
about what it was in 1970, 3 as long as the birth rate remains constant, the rate of
disputes involving children is likely to rise. The rate of marriage has decreased
while coupling has not, and the unwed birth rate has increased dramatically since
1960, so that in 2010 it was about 41%. 4 US unmarried couples, even those with
children, are less stable than their married counterparts. 5 When unmarried parents
with children separate, courts still must deal with custody and child support issues
should the parents want to enforce either or collect public assistance. 6

At roughly the same time as US divorces reached their peak of 50% of first
marriages, Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser published a path-breaking article
in the Yale Law Journal. 7 For the purposes of this paper, the most important point
of ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce’ was that legal rules
set an endowment (or starting) point for bargaining at divorce, bargaining that in its
essence is between money (property, alimony and child support) and time with
children (custody and visitation). A second point was that women are potentially
disadvantaged by a movement toward gender-neutral ‘best interests of the child’
rules away from ‘tender years presumptions’ typically favoring them, because they
might trade financial assets to secure more valued time with their children. This has
not been shown to occur (or at most, rarely). 8 Thirdly, they argued that men might
also take advantage of the rules to behave strategically, threatening to ask for
custody when in fact they did not really want it or wanted less time. 9

See, e.g., D Rotz, ‘Why Have Divorce Rates Fallen? The Role of Women’s Age at
Marriage’ 2012, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1960017; B
Stevenson and J Wolfers, ‘Marriage and Divorce: Changes and Their Driving Forces’ (2007)
21 Journal of Economic Perspectives 27; CC Miller, ‘The Divorce Surge is Over, But the Myth
Lives On’ NY Times, Dec. 21, 2014.
4
National Vital Statistics Report 61(1) (Aug. 12, 2012) Births: Final Data for 2010,
Table C, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr61/nvsr61_01.pdf (40.8%).
5
See, e.g., MJ Carlson, SS McLanahan, and JB Gunn, ‘Coparenting and Nonresident
Fathers’ Involvement with Young Children after a Nonmarital Birth’ (2008) 45 Demography
461, 461.
6
In the US, custody rules pertain not only for divorces but also for separating
unmarried parents. In practice, far fewer of these currently have formal custody or child
support orders. See, e.g., RM Ryan, A Kalil and KM Ziol-Guest, ‘Longitudinal Patterns of
Nonresident Fathers’ Involvement: The Role of Resources and Relations’ (2008) 70 Journal
of Marriage and Family 962.
7
‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce’ (1979) 88 Yale Law
Journal 950. The US divorce rate peaked in 1980-81.
8
See, e.g., L Nepomnyaschy, ‘Child Support and Father-Child Conact: Testing
Reciprocal Pathways’ (2007), 44 Demography 93; E Maccoby and R Mnookin, Dividing the
Child 100-03 (Harvard University Press 1992); R Weiss and R Willis, ‘Transfers Among
Divorced Couples: Evidence and Interpretation,‘ (1993) 11 Journal of Labor Economics 629;
MF Brinig and MW Alexeev, ‘Trading at Divorce: Preferences, Legal Rules and Transaction
Costs‘ (1992-93) 8 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 279.
9
‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce,’ (1979) 88 Yale Law
Journal 950, at 968-971, 972-973.
3
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The divorce bargaining paradigm—that legal rules set bargaining
endowment points—has not only dominated the thinking of family scholars, but has
also influenced custody procedures, particularly because it brought to common
understanding the statistic that 90% of cases settle before trial, 10 a percentage that
has stood up through many empirical tests. 11 While the timing may simply be
fortuitous, it is possible that ‘Bargaining in the Shadow’ played a role in regularizing
child support guidelines (thus removing child support to some extent from the
bargaining table). 12

This piece extends the central argument about the law’s setting an
endowment point. In the US, “best interests” is seen through the lens of parents, 13
The problem with custody adjudication is deciding whether ‘best interests’ should
be set as definitive legal rules, 14 presumptions (or default rules), or standards, like
the ‘best interests’ standard, coupled with lists of factors and giving maximum
flexibility to judges. 15 This piece will explain the current US discussion in terms of

Ibid at 955 and n.23.
See, e.g., SL Braver and E O’Connell, Divorced Dads: Shattering the Myths
(Tarcherhardcover, 1998) T.K. Logan et al., ‘Divorce, Custody, and Spousal Violence: A
Random Sample of Circuit Court Docket Records’ (2003), 18 Journal of Family Violence 269.
See also Joan Hunt & Caridwen Roberts, Child Contact with Non-Resident Parents (2004) 3
Family Policy Briefing 1, Department of Social Policy and Social Work, University of Oxford,
2004 available at http://www.spig.clara.net/reports/hunt.pdf (last visited May 23, 2013);
House of Representatives, Standing Committee on Families and Community Affairs, Every
Picture Tells a Story Report of the Inquiry into Child Custody Arrangements in the Event of
Family Separation 7 & Fig. 1.1 (Parliament of Australia, 2003) (6-7% actually produce a
court judgment), available at
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/House_of_Representatives_C
ommittees?url=fca/childcustody/report.htm (last visited May 23, 2013).
12
Guidelines have been mandated under Title IV of the Social Security Act since the
late 1980s. Family Support Act of 1988, PL 100-485, 102 Stat 2343 (codified throughout 42
USC). For a discussion on the effect of various types of guidelines on divorce rates, with
examples, see DW Allen and MF Brinig, ‘Child Support Guidelines: The Good, the Bad, and
the Ugly’ (2011) 45 Family Law Quarterly 135. The purposes of child support are set forth
in M Garrison, ‘An Evaluation of Two Models of Parental Obligation’ (1998) 86 California
Law Review 41.
13
Unlike the vast majority of nations, the US has not ratified the UN Convention on the
Rights of the Child. Though the term ‘best interests of the child’ is universally used, the
parents act as spokespersons for the child, who is not a party to the parents’ custody suit
and typically does not directly participate. Parham v. J.R., 442 US 584, 602 (1979).
14
Russell Korobkin helpfully writes in terms of a continuum from a fixed rule like the
‘tender years’ presumption to standards like ‘best interests of the child.’ RB Korobkin,
‘Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited’ (2000) 79 Oregon Law
Review 23, 25-27.
15
Importantly, even traditional ‘best interests’ statutes list factors that judges may or
may not take into consideration. The Model Marriage and Divorce Act, Section 402, defines
‘best interests’ to include ‘all relevant factors’ including (1) the wishes of the parents; (2)
10
11
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law and economics analogies and expert points of agreement and disagreement and
then will briefly illustrate what has happened in a state choosing a strong
presumption or default rule. My reluctant conclusion, in line with a group of experts
meeting in 2013 under the aegis of the Association of Family and Conciliation
courts, 16 is that despite the bargaining advantages of rule-like formulations, the cost
of mistakes that will likely impact children requires more flexibility and hence
discretion.
AMERICA’S CHILD CUSTODY PROBLEM

Since 1979, courts and legislatures have endeavored to change the indeterminate
‘best interests’ rule into a more solid presumption. The first wave began with the
frequently cited Garska v McCoy. 17 Concerned about ‘the use of custody… in an
abusive way as a coercive weapon to affect the level of support payments and the
outcome of other issues in the underlying divorce’ and ‘the urgent need…for a legal
structure upon which a divorcing couple may rely in reaching a settlement,’ Justice
Neely’s opinion proposed that ‘the best interests of children would be best served
by awarding them to the primary caretaker parent, regardless of sex.’ The so-called
primary caretaker rule became law for about ten years in West Virginia, for a few
years by statute in Minnesota, and serves as a factor in many more states’ custody
frameworks. 18 Because of prevailing caretaking mores, the presumption resulted in
mothers having custody and fathers visitation the vast majority of the time. 19

the wishes of the child; (3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with parents,
siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best interest; (4) the
child’s adjustment to home, school and community, and (5) the mental and physical health
of all involved. ‘The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not
affect this relationship to the child.’
16
MK Pruett and JH DiFonzo, ‘Closing the Gap: Research, Policy, Practice and Shared
Parenting’ (2014) 52 Family Court Review 152; LC Elrod and MD Dale, ‘Paradigm Shifts and
Pendulum Swings in Child Custody: The Best Interests of Children in the Balance’ (2008) 42
Family Law Quarterly 381, 384.
17
278 SE2d 357 (W Va 1981). For a discussion of the case (included in many US
casebooks), see, e.g., HH Kay, ‘No-Fault Divorce and Child Custody: Chilling Out the Gender
Wars’ (2002) 36 Family Law Quarterly 27, 34 (2002). West Virginia’s primary caretaker
presumption ended in 2001 when the legislature adopted the American Law Institute’s
‘replication’ standard. W Va Code Ann §48-9-206 (Michie 2001).
18
See G Crippen, ‘Stumbling Beyond Best Interests of the Child: Reexamining Child
Custody Standard-Setting in the Wake of Minnesota's Four Year Experiment with the
Primary Caretaker Preference’ (1990) 75 Minnesota Law Review 427.
19
For a recent perspective, see Linda Guerin, ‘Divorce For Men: Why Women Get Child
Custody More Often,’ http://www.divorcenet.com/resources/divorce/for-men/divorce-formen-why-women-get-child-custody-over-80-time (last visited June 2, 2015). Obviously, as
this paper will show, in contested cases, and in some states the actual parenting plans look
quite different. For a discussion of the problems of presumptions creating entitlements (and
therefore functioning like property rules), see ES Scott and RE Emery, ‘Gender Politics and
Child Custody: The Puzzling Persistence of the Best-Interest Standard’ (2014) 77 Law and
Contemporary Problems 69.
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For a time in the 1980s, and increasingly since the turn of the century, joint
custody (meaning alternating or shared placement) has been another option. 20
Because both parents, at least in theory, win, 21 and because judges need not make
difficult custody determinations, joint custody presumptions have been seen as
vindicating parental rights, forcing parents to cooperate in the reconstituted
family, 22 and ensuring children the two parent influence otherwise often lacking at
parental dissolution. 23 The joint custody rule—particularly in its strong form, the
equal custody rule—has been a particular darling of interest groups in the US
concerned about the too real plight of noncustodial parents, especially fathers. 24 As
a ‘rights-based’ approach, it has also gleaned support from some civil libertarians,
though academics argue that it emanates from a child welfare perspective. 25 On a
less exalted plain, because child support guidelines shift once a child spends some
amount of time (typically a quarter to a third) with each parent, wealthier
noncustodial parents are particularly attracted to it. 26

In the 1980s, the two states with preferences for shared physical custody were
Wisconsin and California. Today such legislation is more prevalent. How often it is actually
used or remains viable for parents are other matters. For a chart illustrating the incidence
of joint custody internationally, see B Fehlberg and B Smyth with M Maclean and C Roberts,
Caring for children after parental separation: would legislation for shared parenting time help
children? University of Oxford, Department of Social Policy and Intervention, Policy Briefing
7 (May, 2011) at 4 and Table 1 (3.1% in the UK to 28% in Sweden).
21
See, e.g., M Brinig, ‘Feminism and Child Custody Under Chapter Two of the American
Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution’ (2001) 8 Duke Journal of Gender,
Law and Policy 301, 314. From a men’s perspective, see P. Emeritus, ‘The Primary Caretaker
Fraud,’ Sept. 20, 2102, available at http://www.avoiceformen.com/mens-rights/familycourts/the-primary-caregiver-fraud/.
22
For some generally favorable consideration, see RE Emery, Renegotiating Family
Relationships: Divorce, Child Custody, and Mediation (The Guilford Press, 2d edn, 2012).
23
For a recently adopted statute favoring both parenting plans and joint custody, see
Ariz Rev Stat § 25-403.02B (effective Jan. 1, 2013)(‘Consistent with the child’s best
interests, the court shall adopt a parenting plan that provides for both parents to share legal
decision-making regarding their child and that maximizes their respective parenting time.’)
In Australia, the measure achieved some success with 2006 legislation including the
introduction of a presumption in favor of ‘equal shared parental responsibility’ (Family Law
Act §61DA(1)). See R Weston, L Qu, M Gray, J De Maio, R Kaspiew, L Moloney and K Hand,
‘Shared Care Time: An Increasingly Common Arrangement’ (2011) Australian Institute of
Family Studies, Family Matters No. 88, available at
http://www.aifs.gov.au/institute/pubs/fm2011/fm88/fm88f.html.
24
See, for example, Fathers and Dads for Equal Custody Rights,
http://www.fathersrights.org/.
25
See, e.g., DC Hubin, ‘Parental Rights and Due Process’ (1999) 1 Journal of Law and
Family Studies 123; E Kruk, ‘Arguments for an Equal Parental Responsibility Presumption in
Contested Child Custody’ (2012) 40 American Journal of Family Therapy 33.
26
Judi Bartfeld, Shared Placement: An Overview of Prevalence, Trends, Economic
Implications, and Impacts on Child Well-Being (University of Wisconsin Institute on Poverty,
2011).
20
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As one might predict from Mnookin and Kornhauser’s stress on bargaining,
at the same time as these debates over standards, a growing movement toward ADR
has both engaged and alarmed the major players. 27 While the ALI’s standard
convinced a limited legislative audience, its reliance on parenting plans has surfaced
in virtually every US jurisdiction. 28 Many states mandate mediation in disputed
custody cases, and the remainder allow it when the parents wish it or allow judges
to refer even recalcitrant parents to it. 29 In the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, a
feminist-led objection to the informality and face-to-face nature of mediation when
there was domestic violence 30 or significant power disparity crystalized in
exceptions to mandatory—or sometimes any other form of—mediation. 31 Still more
recently, both judges and other professionals have noted that any kind of default
rule—made to solve the Mnookin and Kornhauser indeterminacy problem—
disadvantages children who need the most help, those with parents in conflicted
custody proceedings, particularly with parents of low- or modest income. 32
In sum, the debate currently is whether there should be any default rule
(facilitating the very large percentage of bargainers and, hopefully, their children) or
whether the statutes and procedures should be drawn to recognize the case-by-case
nature of these ‘best interests’ determinations when they need to be resolved by
litigation.
A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

See, e.g., N Ver Steegh, ‘Yes, No, and Maybe: Informed Decision Making About
Mediation in the Presence of Domestic Violence’ (2003) 9 William & Mary Journal of Women
and the Law 145; see also R Emery, D Sbarra, and T Grover, ‘Divorce Mediation: Research
and Reflections’ (2005) 43 Family Court Review, 22-37.
28
American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, (2002) at § 2.05;
Mo Ann Stat § 452.375 (subd 9); Mont Code Ann § 40-4-234(1); Tenn Code Ann §§ 336-6401 et seq.; Wash Rev Code Ann § 26.09.
29
One early defense of mediation is A Schepard, ‘Taking Children Seriously, Promoting
Cooperative Custody After Divorce’ (1985) 64 Texas Law Review 687. A collection of the
mediation statutes can be seen in Reporter’s Notes to § 2.07, American Law Institute
Principles of Family Dissolution (2000), at pps 171-176, and online updates to present.
30
For one elaborate set of procedures designed to minimize harm in families with
violence, see Department of Justice, Canada, ‘Making appropriate parenting arrangements in
family violence cases: applying the literature to identify promising practices’ available at
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/fcy-fea/lib-bib/rep-rap/2006/2005_3/sum-som.html.
31
See N Ver Steegh, ‘Yes, No, and Maybe: Informed Decision Making About Mediation
in the Presence of Domestic Violence,’ (2003) 9 William & Mary Journal of Women and the
Law 145. It also causes exceptions to parenting guidelines. See Indiana Court Rules,
Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines, Scope, § 1, at 1-2 (2008).
32
See MK Pruett and JH DiFonzo, ‘Closing the Gap: Research, Policy, Practice and
Shared Parenting’ (2014) 52 Family Court Review 152; LC Elrod and MD Dale, ‘Paradigm
Shifts and Pendulum Swings in Child Custody: The Best Interests of Children in the Balance’
(2008) 42 Family Law Quarterly 381, 384.
27
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One theoretical framework, and one already considered in the custody context, is
the rules versus standards (or rules versus discretion) approach. 33 Economist
Lucian Bebchuk notes that the selection of one versus the other depends upon the
relative tradeoffs between large costs at the inception of rules (in figuring out what
would be best and in effectuating legislation or rulemaking) or large costs ex post in
interpreting the necessarily less precise standards. 34 In applying this choice to
family law some years ago, Carl Schneider determined after extensive analysis that
probably the discretion-based ‘best interests of the child,’ properly constrained, was
most appropriate. 35 As stated earlier, some US experts continue to agree with his
conclusion despite the attractiveness of more certainty from a bargaining
perspective.
As someone who has thought about the problem for many years as an
academic, 36 I can see that one way of looking at it might be in the classic Calabresi
and Melamud 37 tradition of property rules, liability rules and inalienability rules. 38
The special twist, of course, is that the ‘property’ being disputed is children, and that
far more than money is always at stake. For the last fifteen years, I have been in
favor of default rules (presumptions) 39 that push parents towards their own
resolution of these conflicts and give them the least incentives on the margin to

See, e.g., RB Korobkin, ‘Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards
Revisited’ (2000) 79 Oregon Law Review 23, 25-27; LD Elrod and MD Dale, ‘Paradigm Shifts
and Pendulum Swings in Child Custody: The Interests of Children in the Balance’ (2008) 42
Family Law Quarterly 381, 390-91; CE Schneider, ‘Discretion, Rules, and Law: Child
Custody and the UMDA’S Best-Interest Standard’ (1990-91) 89 Michigan Law Review 2215.
34
‘Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis’ (1992-93) 42 Duke Law Journal
557, 560, 621.
35
‘Discretion, Rules, and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA’S Best-Interest Standard’
(1990-91) 89 Michigan Law Review 2215, 2218, 2219.
36
I teach dispute resolution as well as family law and was trained in the 1980s as a
family mediator as well as an economist.
37
G Calabresi and AD Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral’ (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089.
38
The latter has been called the ‘stepchild of law and economics.’ S Rose-Ackerman,
‘Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights’ (1985) 85 Columbia Law Review 931, 931.
Lee Anne Fennell, in ‘Adjusting Alienability’ (2009) 122 Harvard Law Review 1404, focuses
on inalienability’s capacity to alter decisions before action is taken to minimize strategic
behavior at relatively low cost. Uneasiness with the transfer of parenting time (even
assuming custody belongs to one or both parents) may center on questions of ‘personhood,
autonomy, paternalism, and the downstream personal and societal consequences of
allowing or blocking transfers,’ ibid p 1405-06.
39
Default rules are common in contractual settings. They at least theoretically provide
for what most parties would have agreed to under the circumstances. See R Korobkin,
‘Inertia And Preference In Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default Rules
and Form Terms’ (1998) 51 Vanderbilt Law Review 1583. Fiduciary duties can be seen as
default rules: see ES Scott and E Scott ‘Marriage as Relational Contract’ (1998) 84 Virginia
Law Review 1225, 1250-51.
33
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divorce in the first place 40 or to litigate if they do. 41 Thus, perhaps I’ve treated the
problem, as Mnookin and Kornhauser did, as a property rule problem. While I
haven’t been very sympathetic to a ‘rights’ approach because there are children
involved (that is, third parties whose interests are the whole point), I do see
minimizing conflict as an important goal. On the other hand, I may have been rather
deaf to the argument that a liability rule, something set down case-by-case by the
judges to keep people from behaving strategically, may be called for since at least
some disputing parents clearly aren’t able to put their children’s interests first, or
are in situations where there is no clear best situation. 42 Obviously any property
rule analogy is not perfect, since the party disadvantaged by the custody rule (or
presumption, or default, depending on the statute) cannot (in theory) ‘buy out’ the
custodial parent 43 and parents do not ‘possess’ their children as they may possess
property.

But a refocus on alienability restrictions, that is, on being particularly
cognizant of and sympathetic to the children involved, would allow more nuanced
adjustments, and would focus attention on pre-conflict behavior, 44 in this case, that
is, on each parent’s involvement with the children pre-separation. What Fennell
calls ‘anxiously alienable goods’ 45 might well include children whose parents
dispute their custody. In conflicted cases, alienability rules require a calculus of
both fairness and efficiency concerns. Clearly either mothers or fathers would
perceive some set of custody allocation devices as unfair (either intrinsically, as
when all fathers or all mothers would receive custody) or particular results as unfair
(as when a parent who did the bulk of child care encountered a joint custody
presumption). 46 Similarly, ‘a paradigmatic source of inefficiency is the costly

See DW Allen and MF Brinig, ‘Child Support Guidelines: The Good, the Bad, and the
Ugly’ (2011) 45 Family Law Quarterly 135; MF Brinig and DW Allen ‘“These Boots Are Made
for Walking”: Why Most Divorce Filers Are Women’, (2000) 2 American Law and Economics
Review 126.
41
The ALI proposal adopted in West Virginia seems to choose an entitlement
corresponding to the efficient outcome. See, e.g., A Schwartz, ‘The Default Rule Paradigm
and the Limits of Contract Law’ (1993) 3 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal
389. A classic law and economics piece suggests that parties will litigate as opposed to
settle when results are uncertain. GL Priest and B Klein, ‘The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation’ (1984) 13 Journal of Law and Economics 1.
42
Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, (Walters Kluwer, 5th edn, 2006) at p 21.
43
That is, there aren’t damage remedies or forced exchanges, but specific, individual
judicial determinations. Fennell notes that this is an advantage of adjusting alienability
rules, 122 Harvard Law Journal at 1408, since ‘alienability limits do not force sales and
hence have different implications for autonomy than do liability rules.’ Ibid at p 1408.
44
Ibid at pps 1412-13.
45
Ibid at p 1413. While parents live together, there are generally no (legal) questions
about how they allocate time with their children.
46
An argument of this kind is made in TR Grillo, ‘The Mediation Alternative: Process
Dangers for Women’ (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 1545, 1595-96. For a contemporary
update in terms of sharing both parenting and continued financial responsibility, see CL
40
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wrangling associated with bilateral monopoly.’ 47 Cutting down on lengthy custody
disputes may be seen as one of the most important values in forming substantive
child custody laws. 48 Two examples of ways inalienability already operates can be
seen in the ALI custody proposals 49 and in the Indiana Parenting Guidelines. 50 Each
set of quite different treatments (since one gives a default rule and the other a set of
guidelines for judges when parents cannot agree), presupposes that some amount of
contact between parent and child should be encouraged regardless of what the
parents did when together. 51 Procedural types of alienability restrictions currently
in effect include a lengthened waiting period for divorces involving children, 52 a
requirement of parenting plans 53 or a rule that the parents attend parenting
classes 54 before a court hears their dispute. Fennell notes that the case for

Starnes, ‘Lovers, Parents, and Partners: Disentangling Spousal and Co-Parenting
Commitments’ (2012) 57 Arizona Law Review 197.
47
Fennell, 122 Yale Law Journal at 1423.
48
The costs of litigation are discussed at pages X[12]. That is not to say that no cases
should go to court: some should, for a variety of reasons, and bargaining impasses should
not continue for long. If parents agree on outcomes, however, they will be more likely
satisfied over the long term and less likely to ‘dig in’ as they almost certainly must if they
litigate. A thoughtful book making this point is RE Emery, Renegotiating Family
Relationships: Divorce, Child Custody, and Mediation 100 (Guilford Publications, 2 edn 2012).
49
Again, these are default rules approximating the pre-separation custody patterns.
50
These are judge-made guidelines with particular, age- and child development-based
propositions that will govern cases if parents cannot determine their own parenting plans.
51
See American Law Institute, Principles of Family Dissolution (2002) § 2.08 (1)9(A) ;
Indiana Court Rules, at p 6. Giving a minimum amount also places an upper boundary, or
maximum amount, of time the other parent can have. This would be seem to meet one of
Fennell’s ‘overharvesting’ concerns, Fennell, 122 Yale Law Journal at 1429-34, though
frequent transfers between parents could also tax the child either because of the amount of
time spent in transportation or in the confusion as the child transitions between homes and
family systems. Fennell uses the example of limiting fishing to the number of fish that can be
consumed at the scene (Prohibiting reselling), ibid at 1433. While obviously not strictly
applicable to the child custody situation, it might be possible to make sure that children are
actually being cared for by the assigned parent rather than a third party. In the Indiana
parenting guidelines, if a paid caretaker would be substituted for work or other reasons, the
other parent is to be given a first option. Indiana Parenting Guidelines, C(3), at 4.
Anecdotally, parents frequently worry about stepparents providing care.
52
E.g. Va Code § 20-91 (9) provides that a divorce can be granted after six months’
separation if there are no children and the couple has entered into a property settlement
(separation) agreement, but one year if they have not.
53
See, e.g., Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 25-403.03; Mo Ann Stat § 452.375(9); Mont Code Ann §
40-4-234(1); Wash Rev Code Ann § 26.09.181(1). The ALI Principles provide for parenting
plans in § 2.05. Parenting plans can also be seen as another type of alienability regulation
under Fennell’s analysis, ‘Specifying particular transfer protocols.’ 122 Harvard Law Review
at pp 1459-63. This would be especially true for parenting plans’ inclusion of modification
provisions.
54
See, e.g., Conn Gen Stat § 46b-69(b)(b); Del Code Ann Tit 13, § 727(b)(2); DC Code
Ann § 16-911(a-2)(2)(D); Fla Stat Ann § 61.121(3); 750 Ill Comp Stat Ann § 5/404.1(a); Or
Rev Stat § 3.425. Many states require them for unmarried parents as well. See S Pollet and
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inalienability rules is strongest ‘when a decision has already been made to intervene
in property entitlements in some manner and the other candidate interventions
involve significant costs.’ 55 It would seem that these features, especially the costs of
continuing conflict, are present in child custody cases when courts already
intervene, justifying some limitation on hostile and vindictive parents’ freedom to
do whatever they like.
THE EXPERT DEBATES

Deciding between fixed or discretionary rules, as policymakers must, should require
examination of the evidence as well as the theory behind the debate. I will
accordingly review this social and behavioral science evidence as I know it,
indicating what is known and what contested. 56 The evidence provides support for
encouraging strong, nurturing relationships with both parents and for stability and
continuity in arrangements, but also indicates that some caution (and therefore
discretion) is warranted because of domestic violence and excessive parental
conflict and because practical circumstances may prevent or impair establishing
two households. 57
The best available studies—those that are long term, using large and
representative samples, and from around the world--show that children are
temporarily disadvantaged by their parents’ separation or divorce. 58 Over the short
term this can be seen in adjustment problems, financial difficulties, and distraction
on the part of parents. Over the longer term, most children (probably in the 70%
range), are quite resilient. 59 Nonetheless US children of divorce, those most often

M Lombreglea, ‘A Nationwide Survey of Mandatory Parent Education’ (2008) 46 Family
Court Review 375, 390-394 and Appendix A.
55
Fennell, 122 Harvard Law Review at p 1463. Again, I am using the model for
analytical purposes rather than to suggest either that children are property or that parents
are “entitled” to them.
56
The Association of Family and Conciliation Courts convened a ‘think tank’ in 2013 to
present evidence from social scientists that might help resolve the various questions
regarding shared parenting. A final report was published as MK Pruett and H DiFonzo, ,
‘Closing the Gap: Research, Policy, Practice and Shared Parenting’ (2014) 52 Family Court
Review 152. The special issue also includes various subgroup reports.
57
For example, some recent ethnographic work on unmarried, poor, nonresidential
fathers suggests that many live with their parents or in other shared quarters rather than in
places where children could stay overnight. K Edin and TJ Nelson, Doing the Best I Can:
Fatherhood in the Inner City (University of California Press 2011).
58
See, for example, PR Amato, ‘The Impact of Family Formation Change on the
Cognitive, Social and Emotional Well-Being of the Next Generation’ (2005) 15 The Future of
Children: Marriage and Child Wellbeing 75, 77.
59
See, EM Hetherington, For Better or For Worse: Divorce Reconsidered (WW Norton &
Company, 2003); JS Wallerstein, JM Lewis and S Blakeslee, The Unexpected Legacy of
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studied, tend to delay marriage longer, marry less often, and divorce more
frequently than children of intact families. 60

Similarly, it is quite well demonstrated that some dissolving families
experience domestic violence either before parents separate or continuing
afterward. 61 The proportion is disputed, but seems to be higher among those who
never married than the married. 62 When children are exposed to violence, no one
doubts that they are harmed. 63 Psychologists and sociologists write that families
with a high degree of visible conflict are those in which children might do better if
their parents divorce (or separate, if unmarried) than if they stay together. 64
Perceived or experienced physical conflict is thus harmful to children. Along the
same lines, some parents (how many is contested) are not fit to be regular
caretakers for children, usually because they are involved with substance abuse,
abuse of children or mental illness. 65 Some might be institutionalized in a variety of
settings. The vast majority of parents are fit to be custodians, however.

Divorce: A 25 Year Landmark Study (Hatchette Books 2000). While these early studies are
about divorce, the same will be true for children of unmarried parents.
60
See, for example, CE Copen, K Daniels, J Vespa and WD Mosher, ‘First Marriages in
the United States: Data From the 2006–2010 National Survey of Family Growth,’ 49
National Health Statistics Reports, Mar 22, 2012. While most work has been done on
children of divorce, the work of the Fragile Families Study is providing insights on children
of unmarried couples. The study website is at http://www.fragilefamilies.princeton.edu.
61 See S Catalino, ‘Intimate Partner Violence, 1993-2010’ Department of Justice, Bureau of
Justice Statistics Fact Sheet (Nov.27, 2012), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipv9310.pdf; showing single mother households
experienced intimate partner violence at a rate more than 10 times higher than those of
married households. Ibid at 2 and Table 1.
62
See, for example A Berger, J Manlove, E Wildsmith, and NR Steward-Streng.,
‘Relationship Violence Among Young Adult Couples’ (2012), Child Trends Research Brief
2012-14, available at http://www.childtrends.org/Files/Child_Trends2012_06_01_RB_CoupleViolence.pdf (45% of married couples and 52% of cohabiting
couples experienced any type of violence; for those resulting in injury, 8% of married
couples and 15% of cohabiting), discussing results from Spain and Great Britain as well.
63
See, e.g., PA Amato and A Booth, A Generation at Risk: Growing Up in an Era of
Family Upheaval (Harvard University Press, 1997) and, more recently, RE Emery,
Renegotiating Family Relationships: Divorce, Child Custody, and Mediation 100 (Guilford
Publications, 2012).
64
For example, see A Booth and P Amato, ‘Parental Pre-Divorce Relations and
Offspring Post-Divorce Well-Being,’ (2001), 62 Journal of Marriage and the Family 197, 210.
65
One study indicates that this proportion is between 8 and 15%. J Johnston, V
Roseby, and K Kuehnle , In The Name Of The Child: Understanding And Helping Children Of
Conflicted And Violent Divorce (Springer, 2009). My research from case files in Arizona
indicates about 15%, and from Indiana 10.3%.

11

There is no dispute over the fact that there are tremendous costs involved in
litigated custody disputes. 66 These costs can be seen in court time (and
resources), 67 the cost of the conflict to the child, the costs to each parent (financially,
emotionally and socially), and the costs of their continuing to have to deal with each
other following litigation, especially in cases involving domestic violence. 68 As we
have seen, there are also costs of uncertainty in deciding what’s best for children.

The experts agree that two-parent married or unmarried families with loving
parents are theoretically best for children and that continuing relationships with
two nurturing parents (biological or adoptive) who no longer live together is
typically the second-best solution. 69 Some, but not all, claim that ‘relationship’
equals ‘parenting time’ so that having a ‘nurturing’ parent necessarily involves
overnight stays. 70 Some claim the confusion caused by moving between two
households outweighs the benefit of frequent overnights, at least for many
children. 71 There is debate about whether the ‘continuing relationship with two
nurturing parents’ trumps or is trumped by the child’s need for continuity and
stability in cases where these conflict. 72 Experts in places that strongly prefer

See LD Elrod and MD Dale, ‘Paradigm Shifts and Pendulum Swings in Child Custody:
The Interests of Children in the Balance’ (2008-2009) 42 Family Law Quarterly 381, 388.
67
See, for example, K Pruett and MK Pruett, Eds, Child Custody (Child and Adolescent
Psychiatric Clinics of North America, 1998).
68
See, for example, JL Hardesty and LH Ganong, ‘How Women Make Custody Decisions
and Manage Co-Parenting with Abusive Former Husbands’ (2006) 23 Journal of Social and
Personal Relationships 543.
69
See, e.g., ‘This paper starts from the viewpoint that evidence fully supports the
benefit to children of having a meaningful relationship with both parents after separation.’
B Fehlberg and B Smyth with M Maclean and C Roberts, Caring for children after parental
separation: would legislation for shared parenting time help children? University of Oxford,
Department of Social Policy and Intervention, Policy Briefing 7 (May, 2011).
70
See, e.g., WB Fabricius, KR Sokol, P Diaz and SL Braver, ‘Parenting Time, Parent
Conflict, Parent-Child Relationships, and Children’s Physical Health’ in K Juehnle and L
Drozd (eds) Parenting Plan Evaluations: Applied Research for the Family Court 188, 193-94
(Oxford University Press, 2012). PR Amato, and JG Gilbreth, ‘Non-Resident Fathers And
Children’s Wellbeing: A Meta-Analysis’ (1999) 61 Journal of Marriage and the Family 557,
review 63 studies on parent–child contact and children’s well-being, finding that quality of
contact is more important than frequency of contact. Obviously some amount of time is
important. A question is whether overnights are critical to achieve meaningful
relationships, and how many.
71
See, e.g., JM Sobowlewski and PR Amato, ‘Parents' Discord and Divorce, Parent-Child
Relationships and Subjective Well-Being in Early Adulthood: Is Feeling Close to Two Parents
Always Better than Feeling Close to One?’ (2007) 85 Social Forces 1105, 1118. Contra, PS
Ludolph, ‘The Special Issue on Attachment: Overreaching Theory and Data’ (2012) Family
Court Review 486.
72
One common place for this debate to play out is in ‘move away’ cases, see, e.g. the
rule enunciated in a California case, Marriage of Burgess, 13 Cal 4th 25, 32-33, 51 Cal Rptr
2d 444, 913 P 2d 473 (1996); and substantially limited by Marriage of LaMusga, 88 P3d 356
(Cal. 2004).
66
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alternating custody do not agree on whether exceptions need to be made when it is
impracticable (say, for a nursing or infant child, 73 or one with disabilities, or when a
parent is in the military, or lives too far away, or both are poor 74).
A PROBLEMATIC PRESUMPTION?

One American state, Arizona, has adopted quite a strong presumption, far on the
continuum away from discretion, maximizing the time with each parent consistent
with the child’s best interests even when the parents do not agree (and perhaps
when neither asks for shared parenting). However, even this statute requires that
courts make awards consistent with the best interests of the child. 75 While legal
custody (called ‘decision making’) will not be shared in cases of proven domestic
violence, domestic violence does not trump the parenting time presumption, though
exchange safeguards may protect the child or the victim of abuse. 76 Not
surprisingly, and even before the most extreme version of the statute was enacted,
there was a tremendous amount of shared custody, now called parenting time, in
the state. 77 An empirical study of more than 500 randomly selected 2008 divorce
For arguments that shared parenting of infants involving overnights is not
appropriate, see J McIntosh, B Smyth, M Kelaher and Y Wells, Post separation parenting
arrangements: outcomes for infants and children (2010) Sydney, Australia: Australian
Government, available at
http://www.familytransitions.com.au/Family_Transitions/Family_Transitions_files/Post%
20Separation%20parenting%20arrangements%20and%20developmental%20outcomes%
20for%20children%20%26%20infants%202010.pdf; RE Emery, Renegotiating Family
Relationships: Divorce, Mediation, and Child Custody (Guilford Press, 2010) at pp 118-119.
74
See, for example, GR Hardcastle, ‘Joint Custody: A Family Court Judge’s Perspective’
(1998) 32 Family Law Quarterly 201, 212-13: ‘Reviewing the literature, one is left with the
feeling that joint custody is an upper-middle class phenomenon’.
75
Ariz Rev Stat § 25-403.02B (effective Jan. 1, 2013)(‘Consistent with the child’s best
interests, the court shall adopt a parenting plan that provides for both parents to share legal
decision-making regarding their child and that maximizes their respective parenting time.’).
The statute goes on to state factors defining best interests, including parental alienation,
false accusations of child abuse, prospective relationships with each parent, and, when age
appropriate, the wishes of the child. In contested cases, the court must give reasons for the
parenting determination.
76
Ariz Rev Stat 25-403.03D.
77
The mean or average of 105 days would constitute shared parenting in most states.
In other states favoring shared parenting, anything over 25% would count as substantial
sharing: see, e.g., Minn. Rev. Stat. § 518.175 (j). Wisconsin’s threshold was 30%, or 109.5
days. LM Berger, PR Brown, E Young, MS Melli and L Wimer, ‘The Stability of Child Physical
Placements Following Divorce: Descriptive Evidence from Wisconsin, ‘(2008), 70 Journal of
Marriage and Family 273, 276. The traditional ‘every other weekend’ visitation award
would equal 52 days, and the more modern ‘every other weekend plus one weekday
evening plus two weeks in summer’ around 68. My numbers in the figure are similar to
those for 2007 reported in J Venohr and R Kaunelis, ‘Arizona Child Support Guidelines
73
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cases involving children from two Arizona counties reveals substantial shared
custody (with the largest number of cases at equally shared time). 78
Figure 1 below shows the number of divorcing couples with children that
gave each amount of parenting time to the non-custodial parent, captioned ‘days of
parenting time’. While there is a range of results (from none to equally shared
time), the figure shows that divorcing parents in Arizona are substantially sharing
custody and that by far the largest single group, about 125 couples, share time
equally.

Review: Analysis of Case File Data’ Center for Policy Research, 2008, page 12 and Exhibit 9,
available at http://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/31/Child%20Support/2008CSGRED.pdf.
78
The study has been presented at the American Association of Law Schools Midyear
Meeting on Family Law (June 21-24, 2015), and will appear in a symposium issue of the
Akron Law Review, spring, 2016. The current draft, including a detailed description of the
methods and data, is available from the author.
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Unfortunately, substantially or equally shared parenting, as de facto (and
now by presumption) occurs in Arizona, gives many opportunities for continuing
conflict and perhaps violence. 79 The table of results that follows shows through a
binary logistic regression (that is, a statistically generated equation predicting
whether or not there will be post-decree violence, a yes or no determination) that as
the number of ‘parenting days’ increases, so does the likelihood of a post-divorce
allegation of domestic violence, in the form of arrests and protective orders. 80 This
can be seen in two features of Table 1: the first is the positive sign in the column
headed ‘B’, the second is the number greater than 1 in the column ‘Exp(B)’. The fact
that this did not occur by chance is shown in the ‘Sig.’ column, which indicates that
the probability of it occurring this way by chance is less than 2%. While the equation
does not show that additional parenting time causes violence, the association is
troubling. 81
Table 1: Likelihood of a Post-Decree Protective Order

Days of parenting time
Protective order sought at
or before divorce
complaint
Mother’s gross monthly
income
Constant

B
.008
1.992

S.E.
.003
.362

Wald
5.919
30.235

Sig.
.015
.000

Exp(B)
1.008
7.332

.000

.000

3.904

.048

1.000

-4.527

.530

73.026

.000

.011

79
There are also effects on other post-decree motions, as well as substantial
discrepancies based on income, race, marital statute (in a larger sample including
unmarried couples) and the presence of lawyers. These are discussed in the paper,
available from the author in draft, forthcoming in the Akron Law Review, 2016.
80
Most of these are directed at one of the parents. A few involve a new partner, and
more than a few involve the children who were the subject of the custody order. I certainly
make no claim that the relationship is causal—that more days of parenting produces more
violence.
81
The results do not explain everything, or even a large portion, of what causes postdecree domestic violence. This will also be related to the ability to screen for it in the first
place, to protect spouses and children through safe exchanges or other monitoring, new
adult relationships formed by the parents, substance abuse, and so forth. Exact statistical
information is available from the author.
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CONCLUSION

When all is said and done, should policy lean toward rule or discretion? Should
rules (or strong default presumptions) be made for the common situation, where
parents are able to reach their own detailed and effective parenting plans, or should
policymakers instead choose a discretionary solution designed to protect the
children who most need it and to produce ample information needed for a case-bycase judicial determination of ‘best interests?’ In some ways, I have argued this
requires a choice between ‘property rules,’ ‘liability rules’ and ‘inalienability rules’.
Perhaps judicial guidelines, like Indiana’s, can provide some balance and cut down
on strategic behavior between hostile parents. Another attractive option seems to
be an ‘efficient’ default rule like the ALI’s approximation standard (which also
includes the limiting of options characteristic of ‘inability rules’). I have been
convinced from the data that the potentially most dangerous option seems to be a
strong presumption or default rule that, while it serves at least one aspect of ‘best
interests’ and in some ways facilitates bargaining, apparently does so at the high
cost of exposing children or parents to conflict and violence.
Finally, any rule is necessarily a rule in flux, for men are clearly doing a much
more significant amount of parenting than they were in the days when the ‘best
interests’ rule first came into vogue. 82 Shared parenting, whether legislated or
merely becoming popularized, is likely to increase. The variations I suggest are
among those allowing for at least some particularized decision-making. I also
strongly suggest the need for more empirical research.

See, e.g., EN Galinsky, K Aumann and JT Bond, Gender and Generation at Work and at
Home (Families and Work Institute, 2009); SN Bianchi, ‘Maternal Employment and Time
with Children: Dramatic Change or Surprising Continuity’ (2000) 37 Demography 401, 411.
82
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